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When Recourses Fail to Protect: Canadian Human Rights
Obligations and the Remedies Offered to Foreigners against
Immigration Decisions
FRANÇOIS CRÉPEAU*
INTRODUCTION
Canada is one of those countries in which immigration is part of the founding
myths.
1. Concurrent Jurisdictions on Immigration, Save for Entry on the Territory
The State is, according to traditional international law, the master of its own king-
dom. In immigration, this means the right to allow or refuse entrance of an alien
on the territory, to impose conditions to her entry, and to expel or deport her from
the territory. In Canada, the Constitution Act of 1867 gives concurrent powers over
immigration to the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures. However,
the control over Canadian borders and the access of non-citizens falls solely under
the federal jurisdiction and, therefore, the provinces and the municipalities are not
responsible for measures and policies relating to the entry of aliens.
Historically, in the Immigration Act of 1869, the ﬁrst such Act adopted after
Confederation, there was explicit reference to the principle of concurrent jurisdic-
tion over immigration and to the idea that the responsibility for the arrival and set-
tlement of immigrants should be shared and negotiated between federal and
provincial jurisdictions.1 Section 95 of the Constitution Act of 1867 states that
provincial legislatures have powers to make laws with respect to immigration mat-
ters in the province. The Parliament of Canada, for its part, may make laws in rela-
tion to immigration for Canada as a whole. Any provincial law relating to
EMIL 7,3_f6_275-300II  11/25/05  6:11 PM  Page 275
276 FRANÇOIS CRÉPEAU
2 See: Chahal v. The United Kingdom (1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 413.
“immigration shall have effect in and for the province as long and as far only as it
is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada” (s. 95 Constitution Act of
1867) [my emphasis].
Whether a provincial law was repugnant to a federal law would ultimately be up
to a court to decide, but the current judicial trend in cases where legislative juris-
diction overlap is to permit wide latitude to each jurisdiction. It may be predicted
that a provincial law relating to immigration that is otherwise constitutional (that is,
that did not offend the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) would likely be
found “repugnant” to the federal law only if it were patently contradictory to it.
The separation of the powers on immigration matters is reﬂected in the current
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (hereinafter IRPA), enacted in June 2002.
Its paragraph 8(1) provides for federal-provincial agreements on immigration. Moreover,
immigration accounts for a signiﬁcant part of Canada’s population, rate of growth
and demographic structure. Therefore it has a strong impact on regional and provin-
cial planning. Section 10(2) of IRPA provides a legal basis for the federal govern-
ment to consult the provinces regarding the number, distribution and settlement of
permanent residents. This provision ensures that the federal government considers
regional requirements when developing or amending immigration and settlement
policies. As per the other duties and responsibilities pertaining to immigration, the
Federal is the jurisdiction in charge. In practice, the province of Québec is the only
province with current immigration legislation and with a provincial immigration
department (Ministère de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles). But even
in the case of Québec, the jurisdiction over the borders and security matters remains
with the Federal.
Hence, the federal has almost “exclusive” jurisdiction: the federal government
makes and administers all laws relating to immigration, except for some in Québec.
In this context, the consultations with the provinces are crucial since these are
directly and substantially affected by immigration by virtue of its impact on the
demand for schools, social services, housing, employment, all provincial matters.
In 1968, Quebec passed its ﬁrst immigration act, allowing the government to
make regulations on a number of matters, including selection criteria, and estab-
lished an immigration department. The act stresses the goals of integration of immi-
grants into the francophone majority culture and their acquisition of the French language.
2. State Actions Limited by Charter
International law provides that States have the right to control the entry, residence
and expulsion of aliens. Any rights of entry or residence possessed by aliens are
more limited than those possessed by nationals. A State may be justiﬁed in restrict-
ing the access of aliens to its territory and in expelling them for security reasons,
provided it does not discriminate2 and it respects its fundamental laws.
In 1982, the Canadian Constitution was redesigned to include the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which identiﬁes and guarantees a set of funda-
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3 Canadian Council for Refugees, State of Refugees in Canada, Montreal, 2002, available at:
http://www.web.net/~ccr/state.html, p. 2.
mental rights. Since 1982, the Canadian Charter provides a national framework of
rights that must be respected, in favour of all human beings, be they nationals or
refugees, immigrants, foreigners and asylum seekers.3 One of the objectives set out
in section 3 of IRPA is “to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s human-
itarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution”
(s. 3(2)c) IRPA).
The Canadian Charter claims to protect individuals only from rights violations
by government (s. 32(1) Canadian Charter). The question of determining who is
protected by the Canadian Charter’s provisions is of clear relevance to immigration
decision making. The Canadian Charter itself provides that some rights are vested
in citizens, others in permanents residents, and still others in “everyone” and “every
individual”. As it will be demonstrated in Part I, fundamental rights are not exclu-
sive to Canadian citizens, but also protect foreigners.
3. The Canadian Immigration Policy
Canada’s immigration law is contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (hereafter IRPR).
Section 3 of IRPA states the objectives of Canada’s immigration policy. The major
objectives are to increase the number of immigrants, to protect the health and the
safety of Canadians, to work in cooperation with the provinces, and to facilitate
reuniﬁcation of families.
There are two principal ways to enter Canada, through a permanent resident visa
or a temporary resident visa. Permanent residents are foreigners who wish to estab-
lish permanently in Canada as opposed to temporary residents who are in Canada
for a limited period of time. Selection of permanent residents is done through fam-
ily reuniﬁcation, economic immigration and refugee protection. Canada’s immigra-
tion is aimed at selecting immigrants in order to answer labour market needs and
to integrate immigrants as soon as possible. There are three components to the
Canadian immigration programme:
a. The social component where Canada facilitates family reuniﬁcation and permits
the nuclear family unit (spouses, dependent children) to immigrate with principal
applicants (s. 3(1)(d) IRPA).
b. The economic component where Canada wants to attract skilled workers and
business immigrants who will contribute to the economic life of the country and
ﬁll labour market needs (s. 3(1)(c) IRPA).
c. The humanitarian component where Canada reinforces its fulﬁlment of its inter-
national legal obligations by granting permanent residence to government-assisted
and privately sponsored refugees (s. 3(2)(b) and (d) IRPA).
The scope of the activities carried out as part of Canada’s immigration program is
extremely wide. The Immigration and Refugee Board (hereafter the IRB) is the
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4 S. 3 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, establishes the Federal Court of Canada as “a
superior court of record having civil and criminal jurisdiction for the better administration of the laws of
Canada”. The Court has jurisdiction over cases by and against the Crown, appeals under numerous fed-
eral statutes, disputes in various commercial matters, and the authority to review decisions of federal
boards, tribunals and commissions, including decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
5 Citizenship & Immigration Canada, Annual Report of 2002, Ottawa, 2002.
largest administrative tribunal in the country, and holds hearings in immigration
matters (s. 173 IRPA) and adjudicates claims to refugee status (s. 170 IRPA).
In addition to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (hereafter
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, or CIC) responsible to run and make immi-
gration policies and the administrative tribunal, other federal departments and agen-
cies are involved in the conducting of the immigration programme. The newly constituted
Canadian Borders Services Agency (hereafter CBSA) provides the primary inspec-
tions on behalf of CIC for all people wishing to enter the country. The Agency is
also involved in other security services given to CIC. Health and Welfare Canada
has certain domestic responsibilities relating to the health of refugee claimants and
others, and supervises the system of medical checks that is mandatory for all immi-
grants to Canada and for certain visitors. The Canadian Security and Intelligence
Service is responsible for security clearances of prospective immigrants. The Royal
Canadian Mounted Police investigates possible violations of the immigration laws.
The immigration program also affects the court system. The Federal Court of
Canada4 has jurisdiction over most immigration matters, a very litigious ﬁeld which
represents over the half of the Federal Court’s workload, at the ﬁrst level.
Canadian immigration and refugee protection issues present continual challenges
and engender almost continual debate for lawmakers, public servants, the media and
the public in general. Strict implementation of the immigration rules may force ordi-
nary people hiding in churches in order to try to stave off deportation. Humanitarian
gestures, as in the reception of some 5,000 Kosovo refugees in spring 1999, are off-
set by public distaste for those who arrive “illegally”. In addition, the effects of the
events of 11 September 2001 continue to echo, and, as we will see in part II, com-
bined with other factors, have an impact on the procedures established towards for-
eign nationals despite the protection of fundamental rights.
I. THE CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
The Canadian immigration programme has speciﬁcities that require some explana-
tion, in order to understand the decline in the rights of foreign nationals. The dis-
parity between the former rights and the new legislation will be emphasized in the
third section. Economic immigrants currently represent almost two thirds of the total
immigration to Canada. Refugees and protected persons constitute only one tenth of
the total and the rest is made of family reuniﬁcation.5 This section will explain the
processes for the permanent resident (economic class, family class and protected
persons class) and the temporary resident (visitors and permit holders).
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6 Québec has its own selection criteria which are similar to the federal system, except as regards lan-
guage. Under the 1991 Canada-Québec Accord, Québec has control of all settlement and integration pro-
grammes for immigrants destined to that province. Québec also sets its own immigration levels (quotas),
establishes the ﬁnancial criteria for sponsors and selects independent immigrants based on the Québec
points system. Basically, only the inadmissibility of immigrants (essentially for health or security pur-
poses) remains of federal jurisdiction.
7 S. 75 and 78 IRPR.
8 Canadian Council for Refugees, Annual Status Report on Refugees and Immigrants, Montreal, 2004,
p. 1.
9 S. 85 IRPR.
10 S. 40 IRPA.
11 S. 67(1) IRPA.
1. The Economic Class
The federal skilled worker class is the most common way to enter Canada as an
immigrant. There are four ways of entering legally to Canada for economic pur-
poses: 1) as a skilled worker; 2) as a business immigrant; 3) as a provincial nomi-
nee; and 4) as a live-in caregiver. This part will focus on the two major ones, which
are the skilled worker class and the business class. Over half of the numbers of the
immigrants who obtained their permanent residence are members of the economic
class, mostly constituted of skilled workers. This class is prescribed as a class of
persons who are skilled and who may become permanent residents on the basis 
of their ability to become economically established in Canada.6 The core element of
the selection process of independent immigrants is the point system, according to
which points are allocated under a variety of headings with a view of identifying
the applicant’s capacity to become successfully established in Canada.7 The federal
government is aiming to increase the number of applicants in this class: it has been
attempting in the last years to limit the number of refugees and family members
granted permanent residence in Canada, in order to achieve their goal of 60% of
immigration being economic and 40% non-economic (refugee and family classes).8
The member of the skilled worker class becomes a permanent resident at the port
of entry after an examination as to the admissibility. If the person is accompanied
by family members, the examination must establish that the family members are not
themselves inadmissible.9 They also have the obligation to make true statements,
otherwise they may become inadmissible. IRPA establishes new grounds of inad-
missibility based on misrepresentation.10 This is of particular importance, because
the right to appeal has been eliminated on that ground, as we will see in section III.
The business immigrant’s programme seeks to promote economic development
and employment by attracting people with venture capital, business acumen and
entrepreneurial skills. This program recognized three categories of immigrants: investors,
entrepreneurs and self-employed immigrants.
Sections 62–71 in IRPA give some rights to appeal before the Immigration and
Refugee Board to contest negative decisions relating to visas, loss of status or
removal orders, to permanent residents. The appeal will be based upon an error of
law or fact, the infringement of a principle of natural justice or humanitarian and
compassionate considerations.11 The effect of the decision is to set aside the previous
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12 S. 67(2) IRPA.
13 S. 64 IRPA.
14 For numbers, consult the yearly Annual Report of Citizenship & Immigration Canada.
15 See s. 12(1) IRPA and ss. 1(3) and 177(1) IRPR.
16 It is possible for a sponsor who is a Canadian citizen to apply while residing outside Canada, as
long as the sponsor resides in Canada when the applicant becomes a permanent resident (art. 130 IRPR).
17 S. 64 IRPA.
decision and to substitute the determination made by the panel.12 We can see that
visa applicants themselves have no appeal against the refusal decision. Moreover, all
foreigners deemed security risks or inadmissible on the ground of misrepresentation
have no right to appeal at all.13
2. The Family Class
Canada’s support for family reuniﬁcation through family sponsorship appeared for
the ﬁrst time during the inter-war period. Helping families reunite in Canada is cur-
rently a key objective of Canada’s immigration law, as speciﬁed in section 3(1)d)
of IRPA. Family class immigrants are people sponsored to come or remain in
Canada by Canadian citizens and/or permanent residents. This class constitutes the
second most important route to come to Canada.14 Those relatives who meet the cri-
teria of membership of the family class are thus not required to meet the selection
criteria imposed on independent immigrants.
Applications under the Family class for immigration from abroad may be made
for a spouse, a common-law or conjugal partner, a dependant child, including a
child adopted abroad, a parent, a grandparent, and for a brother, a sister, a niece, a
nephew or a grandchild who has been orphaned and is under 18 years of age and
is not a spouse or a common-law partner. The dependant child of a sponsored immi-
grant may be included in that person’s application.15
Applicants to permanent resident visa application through family class and their
family members are subject to medical, criminal and background checks. Successful
applicants become permanent residents of Canada, giving the applicant and his or
her family members the right to live, study and work in Canada for as long as they
remain permanent residents. Finally, sponsors must support their sponsored family
members or relatives after they become permanent residents of Canada for a period
which varies according to the categories (often one to three years). Usually, spon-
sors should reside in Canada when making their sponsorship application.16
Section 63 of the IRPA allows for appeals by sponsors of members of the family
class whose application for permanent resident visa was denied. This distinction
emphasizes the fact that the right to appeal is granted only to those who have some
connections with Canada. Again, all foreigners deemed security risks or inadmissi-
ble on the ground of misrepresentation have no right to appeal at all.17
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18 Individuals who apply to come to Canada as temporary residents must also satisfy the visa ofﬁcer
that they are in good health (in some cases a medical examination may be required), they do not have
a criminal record, they do not pose a threat to Canada’s security, they must have a valid passport or
travel document, they have enough money to support themselves and their family members while in
Canada, and they will leave Canada voluntarily at the end of their stay. All refugees producing countries
are countries for which a visa is required.
19 S. 25 IRPA is the most discretionary provision of the Act.
3. The Temporary Resident Class
Temporary residents possess a lawful permission to come into Canada as a visitor
and persons who were granted permit authorizing their entry or stay in Canada are
included in this category.
Foreigners wishing to come to Canada as temporary residents must demonstrate
that they will respect the conditions that apply to temporary residents. One of these
conditions is that they will voluntarily leave at the end of their visit. By deﬁnition,
a temporary resident is a person who is lawfully in Canada for a temporary pur-
pose. Temporary residents include students, foreign workers and visitors such as tourists.
Every temporary resident, except from countries speciﬁcally exempted by the IRPR,
must obtain a temporary resident visa before arriving in Canada. And a visa is
required to everyone who wants to stay in Canada for a period exceeding six
months.
Visa ofﬁcers look at many factors before deciding whether the applicant is a gen-
uine temporary resident, and check especially that the person’s intention is not to
establish permanently in Canada. In order to do so, visa ofﬁcers consider the pur-
pose of the visit and the applicant’s ties to the home country, including the indi-
vidual’s family and employment situation, and the overall economic and political
stability of the home country. The visa ofﬁcer’s assessment is highly discretionary.18
Exceptional circumstances may also justify Minister’s intervention. The Minister
has the power to exempt any foreign national from any application criteria and obli-
gation contained in the Act, and grant the person permanent resident status. Article
25 of the Act gives great power to the Minister without circumcising the scope of
that power.19 Humanitarian and compassionate considerations must take into account
the best interest of the child and public policy interests. Finally, it is also within the
Minister’s powers to issue a temporary resident permit to a foreign national who is
inadmissible or does not meet the requirement of the Act (art. 24 of IRPA). The per-
mit may be cancelled at any time.
Not being a permanent resident or a protected person, temporary residents have
virtually no right to appeal immigration decisions taken against them.
4. The Humanitarian Class
As a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
Canada has an obligation not to send refugees back to persecution. If a mistake is
made in the determination process and a genuine refugee is denied protection and
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http://www.web.net/~ccr/state.html, p. 9.
22 For example, see ss. 117(2), (3), 118, 121, 125 IRPA.
23 S. 63(3) IRPA.
24 S. 64 IRPA.
sent back to persecution, Canada is in violation of its international obligations. In
recognition of its international obligations as a party to the 1984 United Nations
Convention Against Torture and to the 1966 International Convenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Canada, through the IRPA, also offers protection to people in
Canada who face a substantial risk of torture, a risk to their life or a risk of cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment.
As previously mentioned, in 1989, important changes were made to the former
Immigration Act, creating a completely new refugee determination system. The
determination of whether a person is a Convention refugee and is thus entitled to
receive protection in Canada is made in two distinct situations under the refugee
protection part of the legislative scheme: the resettlement program and the refugee
claim process. These categories have been kept in IRPA. Visa ofﬁcers outside
Canada have the authority to grant immigrant visas to those whom they identify as
Convention refugees seeking resettlement. Resettled refugees may be assisted by the
government or sponsored by groups or individuals through the private sponsorship
program. Citizenship & Immigration Canada (CIC) is the federal department respon-
sible for selecting refugees overseas. Alternatively, a person may also make a claim
to be a Convention refugee on arrival in Canada or once inside Canada. The Immigration
and Refugee Board (IRB) is responsible to determine such claims. Applicants who
are resettled in Canada or whose claim is successful become protected persons and
must apply with 180 days to get their permanent residence.20
The Canadian immigration regime excludes some refugee claimants from having
their claim heard. A claim is not eligible if: the claimant has ever before made a
refugee claim in Canada; the claimant has been recognized as a refugee in another
country and can be returned to that country; the claimant came to Canada through
a designated ‘safe third country’; the claimant has been determined to be inadmis-
sible on the basis of security, serious criminality, organized criminality or violating
international and human rights law.
CIC decides whether or not it is eligible. In past years, very few claimants were
found ineligible.21 However, the new legislation brought some changes in terms of
inadmissibility for security purposes.22
Protected persons – deﬁned as persons recognized as Convention refugees, or at
risk of being subjected to torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment –
have a right of appeal against removal decisions.23 Again, all foreigners deemed
security risks or inadmissible on the ground of misrepresentation have no right to
appeal at all.24
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25 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
26 S. 55(1) IRPA.
27 Ss. 3(1)h), 55(1),(2)a) IRPA.
28 S. 55(2)b) IRPA.
29 S. 55 IRPA.
5. Judicial Review
Any person who wishes to challenge a decision, a determination or an order made
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, whether made in Canada or
abroad, may make an application to the Federal Court. Leave – i.e. permission – is
required for the application to proceed. All applications for leave to apply for judi-
cial review are decided by one judge, normally without personal appearance by the
parties. There is no appeal from a decision on a leave application.
The grounds for judicial review are those set out in the Federal Court Act.25 They
are that the body or person:
– acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise
its jurisdiction;
– failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other pro-
cedure that it was required by law to observe;
– erred in law in making its decision, whether or not the error appears on the
face of the record;
– based its decision on an erroneous ﬁnding of fact that it made in a perverse or
capricious manner or without regard to the material before it;
– acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
– acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
6. The Review of a Foreigner’s Detention
The IRPA allows, in very speciﬁc circumstances, the detention of individuals. The
authority to detain in the immigration context exists in Canada to achieve three pur-
poses: to ensure effective removal of inadmissible individuals,26 to protect Canadian
society from persons considered dangerous,27 and to allow for the identiﬁcation of
persons seeking admission.28 The grounds for detention are limited to cases where
the person poses a danger to the public or may not show up for further proceedings
or removal.29
Section 57 of IRPA prescribes the review of the detention when the incarceration
exceeds 48 hours. The person is brought before an IRB member forthwith for
review of the grounds of detention and the Minister establishes a prescribed ground
for the detention. If not released by the adjudicator, the person has to be brought
before an adjudicator, an independent tribunal, at least once during the seven days
immediately following the 48 hours and thereafter at least once during each thirty
day period.
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30 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
31 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 202.
32 In Ha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [2004] F.C.A. 49, David Matas repre-
senting the applicants pleaded the right to a counsel before an immigration ofﬁcer in a visa post abroad.
Unfortunately, the Federal Court of Appeal did not go into the argument of the extra-territoriality of the
Canadian Charter.
33 The seminal decision here is that in Oakes v. The Queen [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
FOR ALL
The next important question which arises from the analysis is the application of the
Canadian Charter. Fundamental rights apply to non citizens. IRPA’s objectives also
include “that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom”
(s. 3(3)d) of IRPA).
The question of determining who is protected by the Canadian Charter’s provi-
sions is of clear relevance to immigration decision making. The Canadian Charter
itself provides that some rights are vested in citizens, others in permanents residents,
such as the mobility rights (s. 6 Canadian Charter), and still others in “everyone”
and “every individual”. The issue of the ambit of the Canadian Charter has been
raised in important cases. In 1985, Singh v. Canada was the ﬁrst case in which the
applicability of the Charter to non-citizens was recognized.30 Wilson J. held that sec-
tion 7 of the Canadian Charter granted rights to every human being who is physi-
cally present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law.31
An important point was then clariﬁed, when deﬁning to whom Charter rights
applied: no distinction was made between persons who have been admitted into
Canada and those still at the port of entry and. The application of the Canadian
Charter to non-citizens outside Canada remains debatable.32
Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter provides that anyone whose rights or free-
doms, as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, have been infringed or denied may
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedies as the court con-
siders appropriate and just in the circumstances. Thus, foreigners whose rights have
been affected are able to take active steps to bring a Canadian Charter issue to the
Court and seek a remedy under this section.
Three headings of Canadian Charter rights are prominently relevant to immigra-
tion law: fundamental freedoms, legal rights and equality rights. The rights included
in these sections are not absolute, each being subject to section 1 of the Canadian
Charter, which provides that ‘the guaranteed rights and freedoms are subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justiﬁed in a
free and democratic society’. If a determination is made that a Charter right has
been infringed, then comes the issue of whether the infringement is justiﬁable under
section 1 of the Canadian Charter. Of course, a rigorous test of justiﬁability under
section 1 has been set out by the courts.33
The impact of the Canadian Charter on the practice of immigration law has been
quite signiﬁcant: a substantial number of legal challenges on behalf of those who
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34 See: Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Baker
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; United States v. Burns, [2001]
1 S.C.R. 283; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.
35 Al Yamani v. Canada (Solicitor General) [1996] 1 F.C. 174 (T.D.).
36 “Member of an organization likely to engage in violent acts.” This offence is now found under s.
34(1) IRPA.
have been subject to negative decisions haven been based on Charter grounds. After
Singh, which required the restructuring of the refugee determination process, the
courts have generally avoided liberal interpretations of the Canadian Charter, and
they have built a pattern of decision-making characterized by a rather narrow and
restrictive approach to the rights of immigrants and refugee claimants. Moreover,
the courts have shown a marked reluctance to scrutinize, to challenge or to reshape
the policies of the federal government in this area of decision-making. Thus,
although tribunals have progressively recognized rights of foreigners, this has been
a slow process.
It is therefore remarkable that some foreigners have been able to challenge such
decisions up to the Supreme Court, which has allowed appeals from, for example,
a drug dealer threatened with removal to the country of origin where it was likely
that the drug cartel would eliminate him, a mentally disabled mother of eight with-
out immigration status in Canada threatened with return to the country of origin
without taking into account the interests of her four Canadian children, a murderer
threatened with extradition to the United States where he would face death penalty,
a Sri Lankan ﬁnancer of the Tamil Tigers – an organization listed as terrorist – who
would face serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka.34
1. Freedom of Association
Section 2 of the Canadian Charter identiﬁes a list of fundamental freedoms that
everyone possesses, including freedom of association. A number of Charter chal-
lenges to immigration law have been based on this section, predominantly on the
grounds that they impede freedom of association.
In Al Yamani v. Canada,35 it was held that part of section 19(1)g) of the former
Immigration Act of 197636 – proscribing the admission to Canada of members of an
organization likely to engage in violent acts that will endanger the safety of people
in Canada – was unconstitutional on the ground that, by rendering inadmissible
those who were merely members of organizations likely to engage in acts of vio-
lence, it violated the applicant’s freedom of association. Moreover, the provision
was not saved by section 1 of the Canadian Charter because the court found that
no rational connection existed between the aim of protecting the safety of people in
Canada and the restrictions of the freedoms of individuals who are merely members
of an organization. It was also held that the restriction was not proportional to the
objective.
EMIL 7,3_f6_275-300II  11/25/05  6:11 PM  Page 285
286 FRANÇOIS CRÉPEAU
37 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures 2002, Ottawa.
38 The following questions are taken from: Donald Galloway, Immigration Law, Toronto: Irwin Law,
1997, p. 57.
2. Mobility Rights
There is a right to freedom of movement given to every individual in Canada: the
right to take up residency anywhere in Canada is guaranteed by section 6 of the
Canadian Charter. Immigrants tend however to settle disproportionately in Canada’s
large urban centres: in 2000, close to 50% of all immigrants settled in Toronto and
30% in Montréal and Vancouver.37 Therefore, the immigrant may initially state that
she is going to live in Québec, for example, but still has the right to leave and move
somewhere else in Canada. There may still be some requirements with respect to
the location of the job that is to be fulﬁlled by some immigrants.
3. Legal Rights
The rights protected under section 7 of the Canadian Charter have been the object
of more judicial analysis than any other. This is especially true in the immigration
ﬁeld. The section reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and secu-
rity of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice” [my emphasis].
This statement raises several questions in relation to immigration issues.38 What
procedures are required by the principles of fundamental justice? What factors are
to be taken into account when deciding if these factors are consistent with these
principles? Do the principles of fundamental justice prohibit or require access to
decision-makers? Does an individual have a right not to be excluded from the
refugee determination process? Does a person have a right to an appeal from a neg-
ative decision? What is the substantive content of the right to life, liberty and secu-
rity of the person? Are these rights infringed by an order excluding or removing a
person from Canada? Are they infringed by an order against a family member of
whom one is dependant, such as a parent or a spouse? Since 1985, the Courts have
tried to answer these questions and to limit the scope of section 7, but nevertheless
always recognized its application to foreign nationals.
The procedural requirements of the principle of fundamental justice are generally
analyzed according to the administrative law principles of procedural fairness. The
central issues are:
– whether or not the procedures are adequate to allow a full presentation of the
case and a proper determination of the issues;
– where a hearing has been granted, whether adequate notice of its nature has
been given;
– whether there has been sufﬁcient disclosure of evidence;
– whether adequate opportunity to respond to negative evidence has been given;
– whether adequate legal representation and interpretation is available; and
– whether there have been unjustiﬁable delays in proceeding.
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4. Refugee Determination Process and Fundamental Justice
In Singh v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the refugee determina-
tion process did not meet the procedural requirements of section 7 of the Canadian
Charter, since it did not provide claimants with an oral hearing during which they
could state their case. The Singh decision recognized that refugee claimants were
entitled to fundamental justice under the Canadian Charter.
The issue at stake was whether the then current procedure for determining refugee
claims unjustiﬁably infringed upon the claimants’ rights under section 7 of the Canadian
Charter. Wilson J., for the majority, observed that the claimants, not being citizens
or permanent residents of Canada, had no right to enter and remain in Canada, but
she held that this lack of status did not bar their challenge of the procedure by
which their claim to be a Convention refugee was to be determined. The challenge
was based on the fact that no oral hearing was afforded to them. Wilson J. stated that
Given the potential consequences for the appellants of a denial of the status if
they are in fact a person with a “well-founded fear of persecution”, it seems to
me unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to fundamental
justice in the adjudication of their status.39
Wilson J. concluded that the principles of fundamental justice must be respected
when the issue of genuineness is being determined. She insisted that where issues
of credibility were likely to arise, as they often are in refugee cases, the principles
of fundamental justice required that an oral hearing take place.
This decision prompted extensive reform to the determination process. The
Immigration Act of 1976 was amended to include access criteria that a claimant
must meet before being allowed to make a refugee claim. The Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB) was established in 1989 and then signiﬁcantly reshaped in
1992.
As will be seen, the impact of Singh has been diluted by legislation and recent
cases.
In Nguyen v. Canada, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision that he
was ineligible to have his claim considered by the Refugee Division on the ground
that he had committed a serious offence and the minister had certiﬁed that he was
a danger to Canada.40 The challenge was based partly on the fact that the procedure
by which the minister issued a certiﬁcate did not allow for an oral hearing. The
application was denied. Marceau J.A. distinguished Singh on the ground that, under
the law at the time, Singh had a right to make a refugee claim, while the applicant
in this case had not been granted a right to seek refugee status. He also concluded
without analysis that when eligibility to make a claim is being determined, there is
no need to have an oral hearing. This seems to clearly contradict the Singh decision
where Wilson J. clearly stated that whether or not one has a right or a privilege at
stake should not be a determining factor in recognizing that person their right to be
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heard.41 The consequences of the deportation on the individual should lead the
analysis on whether or not an oral hearing should be granted.
Another case was distinguished from Singh by the Federal Court. In McAllister v.
Canada, the Minister had determined that it was contrary to the public interest to
allow the applicant to make a refugee claim on the ground that there was reason to
believe that he was a member of a terrorist organization.42 No oral hearing had been
granted to the applicant before this decision was reached. Singh was distinguished
by McKay J. on the ground that no credibility issue was at stake and that a process
which allowed only written submissions to be made was sufﬁcient to meet the
requirements of section 7 of the Charter.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Chiarelli v. Canada, considered the constitu-
tionality of a deportation order against a permanent resident who had been in
Canada for eleven years, since the age of ﬁfteen.43 The order had been issued on
the ground that he had committed a serious criminal offence. At the Federal Court
of Appeal, the deportation procedures to which Chiarelli had been subjected, which
involved the issuance of a security certiﬁcate, had been found to be unconstitutional
because they were in violation with section 7 of the Charter. The latter decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Sopinka J. held that it was not nec-
essary to focus on the question of whether the appellant has been deprived of his
right to life and security since there had been no breach of fundamental justice. 
He concluded that the procedures followed by the Security Intelligence Review
Committee were consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. Although a
part of the hearing had been conducted in camera, Chiarelli had been provided with
a summary of evidence sufﬁcient to allow a response. Sopinka J. notes that:
[While] an individual has an interest in a fair procedure [. . .] the state also has
a considerable interest in effectively conducting national security and criminal
intelligence investigations and in protecting police sources [. . .] The CSIS
[Canadian Security Intelligence Service] Act and Review Committee recognize
the competing individual and state interests and attempt to ﬁnd a reasonable bal-
ance between them.44
Sopinka J. has engaged in the balancing of fundamental justice against state inter-
ests when determining the content of a right to fundamental justice. This decision
shows a signiﬁcant shift after Singh.
Later the Federal Court reiterated the Supreme Court’s position in Chan v.
Canada,45 where Chiarelli was followed. In Chan, the applicant challenged section
82.1 of the former Immigration Act of 1976, which allowed for non-disclosure of
conﬁdential information to an applicant seeking judicial review of a visa’s ofﬁcer
decision on grounds of section 7 of the Canadian Charter. Cullen J. rejected the
challenge, stating that:
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47 See: Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053.
While fundamental justice demands a fair procedure, its does not demand a per-
fect system of full disclosure and full oral hearing in every case. These principles
of fundamental justice are not immutable, but can vary according to the context
in which they are invoked. In the context of section 82.1(10), the secret infor-
mation is carefully reviewed by a judge of this Court and he or she must con-
sider whether the information could be revealed to the person concerned. While
the applicant does not get a summary of the conﬁdential evidence, as in the case
of a certiﬁcate ﬁled under section 40.1 of the Immigration Act, she is told why
she is being denied admission to Canada.46
The new Act restates the same rule in its section 87. These two examples show the
fragile status of the foreigner’s right to fundamental justice.
The idea that principles of fundamental justice can vary according to the context
was also emphasized in other cases. For example, the court held that the principles
of fundamental justice do not require that a person be provided with counsel at a
port of entry interview when notes were being taken by a senior immigration
ofﬁcer.47 These notes were later used as evidence during an inquiry into whether
there was a credible basis to the applicant’s refugee claim. Iacobucci J., from the
Supreme Court of Canada, held that the grant of counsel at this early stage would
change its nature from a process to determine the appropriate procedures into a
mini-inquiry just as complex and prolonged as the inquiry provided for under the
Act and Regulations. Since this decision, broader powers have been granted to sen-
ior immigration ofﬁcers at port of entry, including the power to determine the eli-
gibility of refugee claimants to have their claim heard by the IRB.
III. THE REDUCTION OF THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY UNDER 
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LAW
Permanent residents are, on paper, on an equal footing with Canadian citizens. The
rights granted to Canadian citizens are also provided to the permanent residents
except for the right to vote and be elected, the right to enter and remain in Canada
and the right to minority language education (ss. 3, 6, 23 Canadian Charter respec-
tively). Armed forces and employment related to Canadian security are also limited
to Canadian citizens.
The permanent residence is the last step before acquiring Canadian citizenship:
unless one commits a crime, obtaining citizenship after three years of permanent
resident status is almost automatic. The idea is to integrate foreigners who intend to
stay permanently in Canada as soon as possible. It is derived from the Canadian
immigration philosophy. However, as we will see, there are discrepancies in the
remedies offered to permanent residents and more restrictive access for foreign
nationals who have no status yet in Canada.
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48 S. 77 IRPA.
49 Canadian Council for Refugees, The Refugee Appeal: Is No One Listening?, Montréal, 2005.
50 The grounds for judicial review, set out in s. 18.1(4) Federal Court Act, are that the tribunal whose
decision is being challenged: (a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to
exercise its jurisdiction; (b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other
procedure that it was required by law to observe; (c) erred in law in making a decision or an order,
whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; (d) based its decision or order on an erro-
neous ﬁnding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material
before it; (e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or (f) acted in any other
way that was contrary to law.
1. Appeals Have Been Replaced by Judicial Review
In Canadian immigration law, since the early 1990s, most forms of appeal previ-
ously available to foreigners have been eliminated. Appeals allow the applicant to
contest the validity of adverse decisions, on legal and factual grounds, and to obtain
a new decision by a new decision-maker. In Canada, as mentioned before, the immi-
gration process produces numerous decisions. The complexity of the stories and the
level of factual knowledge required in order to process application mean that the
decision-makers must develop a great level of expertise. An expert quasi-judicial
body, such as the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, can allow for the
development of such expertise. But it remains that, since the nature of the decisions
made on immigration cases is administrative and since they are most often based on
the interpretation of complex factual evidence, appeals are crucial.
Judicial review remains available, but only with leave (or permission) from the
Court and essentially only on legal issues. For example, a rejected refugee claimant
can apply to the Federal Court for leave to seek judicial review.48 However, such
leave is rarely granted and the Court does not provide a reason when it denies leave.
From 1998 to 2004, 89% of applications to the Federal Court for judicial review of
refugee claim determinations were denied leave. If we compare the number of appli-
cations granted leave during this period (under 4,000), with the number of claims
refused by the Immigration and Refugee Board during this period ( just under
87,800), we ﬁnd that only 4% of refused claimants had the opportunity to have the
decision against them reviewed by the Federal Court.49
Furthermore, when a claimant is granted leave by the Federal Court, factual mis-
takes will generally not be corrected since the Court will not review the factual
analysis, unless it was wholly unreasonable.50 Reviewable mistakes include mistakes
such as the decision-maker failing to take into consideration relevant evidence or
drawing unreasonable conclusions from the evidence. If the original decision-
maker considered all the evidence in a reasonable way, but reached the wrong 
conclusion, the Court will not intervene. Thus, judicial review does not review the
merits of the case. It is particularly difﬁcult to get a decision overturned when it
hinges on the credibility of the claimant’s testimony, since the Court will usually
say that the decision-maker who heard the claimant is best placed to judge whether
they were credible.
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52 Ss. 77(3.01) and 19(1)(c), (c1), (c2), or (d) Immigration Act 1976.
53 S. 64 IRPA. See also: François Crépeau, Estibalitz Jimenez. 2004. “Foreigners and the Right to
Justice in the Aftermath of 9/11”. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 27(6):609–26.
54 S. 64(3) IRPA. There is a right to appeal if the foreign national in question is the sponsor’s spouse,
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55 S. 171 IRPA. Not in force yet.
56 Canadian Council for Refugees, The Refugee Appeal: Is No One Listening?, Montreal, 2005, p. 10.
57 Ss. 110, 111 IRPA.
58 Canadian Council for Refugees, The Refugee Appeal: Is No One Listening?, Montreal, 2005, p. 1.
A decision can be wrong and, if it does not contain the kind of mistake subject
to review by the Federal Court, which is the only forum where a negative refugee
determination can be overturned, it is ﬁnal.
1.1 Permanent and Temporary Residents
Since the implementation of the new legislation in 2002, no appeal is now available
to a sponsor (it is the same with visa holders and Convention refugees) in the fol-
lowing two situations:51 (1) where a security certiﬁcate has been signed and where
the certiﬁcate has been determined to be reasonable by a federal court judge; and
(2) where the minister is of the opinion that the person is a danger to the public
and the person is also inadmissible under speciﬁed paragraphs of section 19 of the
former Act52 or of sections 34 and 35 of IRPA.
Even Canadian sponsors of foreigners found to be inadmissible on grounds of
security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized
criminality, have been deprived of any right to appeal.53 Moreover, IRPA speciﬁes
that no more appeal is possible with respect to a decision based on a ﬁnding of
inadmissibility on the grounds of misrepresentation.54
1.2 Refugees
For refugees who are rejected in the resettlement program, there is no right of
appeal. For refugee claimants in Canada, the situation could be different.
The IRPA created a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) where refugee determina-
tions could be reviewed on questions of law, facts or mixed questions of law and
facts.55 The RAD is a direct response to a longstanding criticism of the Canadian
refugee determination process, one of the few of the Western world to lack an
appeal.56 The appeal approved by Parliament is however a modest one, limited to a
paper review.57 This new recourse balanced the reduction of the number of board
members hearing the claimant’s initial application from two to one.
However, when the government implemented the new legislation in June 2002, it
did not create the Refugee Appeal Division, maintaining this decision for an inde-
terminate period of time.58 The government has failed to this day to implement the
Refugee Appeal Division, despite repeated promises by the Minister to do it by 2003.
The government has repeatedly justiﬁed its failure to respect the law by reference
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to management concerns such as backlogs, number of claimants and length of pro-
cessing times, and resources constraints.59
The management of immigration ﬁles is certainly made more efﬁcient, but human
rights protection has been radically diminished, as unanimously observed by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, UNHCR and CAT respectively in
2000, 2002 and 2004.60 As Prof. Dyzenhaus rightly points out:
The Canadian government is joining the ranks of Western governments which are
using the political context created by 9/11 to renege on a general commitment to
the rule of law. This fact is most marked in the area of immigration and refugee
law. Canada is now in ﬂagrant violation of one of the central pillars of the rule
of law, the right of access to an independent court to test the legality of decisions
affecting basic rights. Judicial review of such decisions is available, but only on
leave, which is infrequently granted. That this is an inadequate safeguard has
been recognised through a legislative promise to establish a Refugee Appeal Division,
a promise which the government refuses to implement. In persisting with this
refusal, the government exhibits the two faced stance which is so depressingly
common these days whereby governments maintain the facade of the rule of law
without delivering its substance.61
2. Legal Aid Remains Inadequate
The Constitution Act of 1867 provides for the different levels of government and
their jurisdiction. Immigration, as we saw, is an area of mixed jurisdiction but is
mainly dealt with by the federal government. For matters falling under “property
and civil rights” (s. 92(13) Constitution Act of 1867), such as legal aid, the
Provinces are exclusively responsible for developing and managing the policies, 
and they make appropriate decisions on how to run programs with respect to this
matter.
Based on the Canadian Charter, the refugee determination process is quasi-judi-
cial and each refugee claimant has the right to a hearing with full interpretation and
the right to counsel (see Singh above). However, it has never been deemed impor-
tant, in Canadian law and policy, to provide sufﬁcient legal aid to help refugees pre-
pare their case. Although the refugee determination system is of federal jurisdiction,
legal aid in such matters has been left to the provincial legal aid schemes without
insuring some equalization.
In Ontario, the average legal aid fee for a refugee determination case is still over
CAN$1500. In Quebec, it is CAN$455 (for one asylum seeker, without any deten-
tion hearing, before judicial review), which represents 3 hours of work, if an inter-
preter is not required. In British Columbia, legal aid for refugee determination cases
was totally eliminated in June 2003, although further negotiations resulted in the re-
EMIL 7,3_f6_275-300II  11/25/05  6:11 PM  Page 292
WHEN RECOURSES FAIL TO PROTECT 293
62 See: François Crépeau, Estibalitz Jimenez. 2004. “Foreigners and the Right to Justice in the
Aftermath of 9/11”. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 27(6):609–26; John Frecker, Pierre
Duquette, Don Galloway et al. 2002. “Representation for Immigrants and Refugee Claimants”. Study
Report. Accessed 23 March 2005. http://canada.justice.gc.ca.
63 Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053.
64 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 213, 226–227
(Wilson J.).
65 For more details on the funding programme, see: Justice Canada, Report of the Department of
Justice Canada on the Legal Aid programme, Ottawa, 2001, available at: http://canada.justice. gc.ca/en/
ps/eval/reports/01/legal_aid/legal_aid_1.html.
66 See: Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution, [1984] 2 F.C. 642; Rodriguez v. British Columbia
(Attorney General) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519; R. v. Rowbotham [1994] 2 S.C.R. 463; New Brunswick (Minister
of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.) [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46; Winters v. Legal Services Society
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 160; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Jaballah [2003] F.C.J. No.
1274 (C.A.); United States of America v. Akrami [2001] B.C.J. No. 174.
introduction of a limited service in March 2004. The importance of legal aid in
criminal cases has been underscored, in order to help accused persons to defend
themselves properly and ensure the legitimacy of any subsequent guilty verdict. If
the worst maﬁa boss has a right to legal aid, why is it that, in refugee cases, when
the consequences of an erroneous decision can be death, torture or prison, the pro-
vision of legal aid is not thought equally important?62
The Supreme Court of Canada examined the issue of the right to counsel as a
facet of the principles of fundamental justice in Dehghani v. Canada.63 According
to Singh, the procedures set out in the former Immigration Act must “provide an
adequate opportunity for a refugee claimant to state his case and know the case he
has to meet”.64 It is this constitutional requirement which is the basis for a right to
funded counsel for refugee claimants. Moreover, federal cost-sharing arrangements65
covering refugee claimants indicates that, in all cases, refugee claimants need coun-
sel to assist them to adequately present their case.
Since Dehghani, there has been no Canadian jurisprudence resolving the issue
with respect to refugee claimants. However, cases in the criminal and child protec-
tion law contexts offer some suggestions for criteria which may be applied.66 A sim-
ilar set of criteria (the level of difﬁculty of the claim, the effect of ministerial participation
and the characteristics of the claimant) should be used to form the basis of an
administrative structure to ensure funded counsel, for all impecunious refugee
claimants throughout Canada are the principal elements to justify the right to funded
counsel.
3. Security Certiﬁcates Trump the Right to Justice
In addition to objectives relating to the facilitation of the admission of immigrants
and the protection of refugees, an important objective is to maintain and protect the
health, safety and good order of Canadian society. In furtherance of this objective,
sections 34 to 42 of IRPA lists classes of inadmissible foreign nationals. Sections
34, 35 and 36 describe individuals involved in espionage, subversion of democratic
governments or terrorism.
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67 As numerous countries of the world, Canada is also a party to the twelve anti-terrorism conven-
tions, among which: 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft;
1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; 1973 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; 1971 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation; 1977 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; 1979
Convention against the Taking of Hostages; 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material; 1998 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.
68 An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Criminal Code in consequence thereof, Section
40.1 was amended by An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and other Acts in consequence thereof, pro-
claimed in force February 1, 1993.
69 Ss. 39, 40 Immigration Act, 1976.
70 Ss. 40.1, 40.2 Immigration Act, 1976.
71 S. 55(1) IRPA.
Following the events of 9/11, the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act, adopted on 24
December 2001, amended the Criminal Code and created new offences related to
terrorism. Canada is not the only country which has put in place mechanisms
against terrorism actions, especially after 9/11.67 However, as will be demonstrated,
the stress put on the fear factor took such place that the humanitarian tradition was
put aside and the human rights acquis infringed.
3.1 Terrorism as a Ground for Detention and Removal
In 1988, the former Immigration Act 1976, was amended68 to include two distinct
schemes governing the removal from Canada of persons with criminal or terrorist
backgrounds or individuals inclined to serious criminality actions. One regime
applied to permanent residents69 and another one governed other foreigners.70 In its
section 38.1, it enumerated the objectives for enacting the new provisions:
a) to enable the Government of Canada to fulﬁl its duty to remove persons who
constitute a threat to the security or interests of Canada or whose presence endan-
gers the lives or safety of persons in Canada;
b) to ensure the protection of sensitive security and criminal intelligence infor-
mation; and
c) to provide a process for the expeditious removal of persons found to be mem-
bers of an inadmissible class referred to in section 39 or 40.1.
IRPA stipulates that the same procedures prescribed for foreign nationals will be
applicable to permanent residents.71 However, the detention scheme applicable
remains different. The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Solicitor
General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a permanent resident
who is named in the certiﬁcate if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the
permanent resident is a danger to national security or to the safety of any person or
is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal. If the detention is required,
IRPA provides for a review after 48 hours and is brought back before a judge at
least once in the six-month period following each preceding review and at any other
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times that the judge may authorize.72 Interestingly, the Federal Court, in Jaballah,73
had concerns with the detention of a foreigner who was in detention in solitary
conﬁnement, since mid-August 2001. A motion to preserve Mr. Jaballah’s funda-
mental rights was heard by the Court on April 11th, 2003. Meanwhile, no ﬁnal deci-
sion on his application to the Minister has been communicated to the Court, as has
been expected in accordance with the IRPA and the IRPR. The motion was based
on the principle of abuse of process and claiming Charter interests. In MacKay J.
opinion, the “delay in determining Mr. Jaballah’s application for protection while he
remains in detention, with no reasonable forecast of when that decision will be
made, constitutes abuse of process in this case”.74
The security certiﬁcate regime offers an alternative process for the removal of for-
eign nationals who are considered to be inadmissible to Canada for serious security
reasons. In fact, the regime overrides other provisions of the legislation relating to
detention and judicial review. Detention and removal of foreign terrorists, whether
currently active or professed to be retired, are considered necessary for the safety
of the public in Canada and for the security of Canada. The Federal Court stated
that “individuals who engage in terrorism are very dangerous, frequently fanatical
in their beliefs, have little regard for human lives including their own and are tran-
sient”.75 Even though the issuance of a certiﬁcate results in the arrest and detention
of the person involved, this detention is not imposed for punishment. Rather, it is
intended to provide preventive detention to ensure the expulsion of the individual
and to safeguard the Canadian public.
The most recent case on security certiﬁcate from the Supreme Court of Canada
is the case of Suresh.76 Mr. Suresh is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil descent, and an
executive member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Sri Lankan
organization listed as a terrorist organization. In Canada, evidence showed that he
had been involved, under cover of the World Tamil Movement, in raising funds to
support the activities of the LTTE. It was on the basis of a Security Intelligence
Report, prepared by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, that Mr. Suresh
was found inadmissible as “being someone who there are reasonable grounds 
to believe has engaged in terrorism, and is or was a member of an organization 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was engaged, or will engage, in
terrorism”.77 In fall 1995, the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration signed a security certiﬁcate under section 40.1 of the
Immigration Act 1976.78 Mr. Suresh was arrested in October 1995, and detained: the
authorities initiated deportation proceedings. The appeal to the Supreme Court was
heard prior to 11 September 2001, but the decision rendered subsequent to those
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events and after the coming into force of the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act. The
Court had to decide whether expelling a suspected terrorist to a country where he
faced the risk of torture violated the principle of fundamental justice in contraven-
tion to section 7 of the Canadian Charter. From a domestic perspective, the
Supreme Court recognized that Canada has a legitimate and compelling interest in
combating terrorism but is also committed to fundamental justice:
On the one hand stands the manifest evil of terrorism and the random and arbi-
trary taking of innocent lives, rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of loss and
fear. Governments, expressing the will of the governed, need the legal tools to
effectively meet this challenge. (. . .) On the other hand stands the need to ensure
that those legal tools do not undermine values that are fundamental to our dem-
ocratic society – liberty, the rule of law, and the principles of fundamental jus-
tice – values that lie at the heart of the Canadian constitutional order and the
international instruments that Canada has signed. In the end, it would be a Pyrrhic
victory if terrorism were defeated at the cost of sacriﬁcing our commitment to
those values. Parliament’s challenge is to draft laws that effectively combat ter-
rorism and conform to the requirements of our Constitution and our international
commitments.79
The Supreme Court then considered the same question in light of international stan-
dards and conﬁrmed the absolute prohibition of torture and the principle of non-
refoulement “even where national security interests are at stake”.80 By holding that
consideration must be given not only to Canadian experience and jurisprudence, but
also to international law, the Supreme Court established that courts have to use stan-
dards of international human rights law deﬁned in treaties and custom to inform
Charter interpretation and, in particular, to serve as evidence of the principles of
fundamental justice. In Suresh, however, the Supreme Court recognized the dilemma
facing the judiciary in integrating international treaty standards which are not bind-
ing upon Canadian courts in domestic law, because they have not been incorporated
into Canadian law.
3.2 The Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Security Certiﬁcate Process
A Charter challenge to section 40.1 of the former Immigration Act 1976 occurred
in another signiﬁcant immigration case. Section 40.1 outlines a process whereby a
judge of the Federal Court reviews the reasonableness of a security certiﬁcate signed
by the Solicitor General and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, declaring
that a person is inadmissible for speciﬁed reasons such as espionage or terrorism.
The constitutionality of the security certiﬁcate process has been challenged in the
Federal Court in Ahani 81 on the basis that the process violates sections 7 (right to
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83 Ahani v. Canada, [1995] 3 F.C. 669, at p. 679.
84 Ahani v. Canada, [1995] 3 F.C. 669, at p. 692.
liberty), 9 (protection against arbitrary detention) and 10(c) (right to habeas corpus)
of the Canadian Charter. The Federal Court dismissed the action and concluded that
section 40.1 does not violate the Canadian Charter and is constitutional. Justice
McGillis of the Federal Court found that:
In enacting section 40.1 of the [former] Immigration Act, Parliament created a
mechanism for the expeditious review by an independent judicial arbiter of the
reasonableness of the decision of two separate ministers to issue a certiﬁcate that
a person, other than a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, is a member of an
inadmissible class of persons for various speciﬁed reasons, including terrorism.82
Justice McGillis dealt with the issue of delay of the reasonableness hearing by the
person named in the certiﬁcate in the following terms:
In the event that the named person fails to avail himself of the opportunity to be
heard within a reasonable period of time, as occurred in this case, the designated
judge should proceed to determine the reasonableness of the certiﬁcate on the
basis of the evidence and information available. Indeed the fact that Parliament
clearly intended these proceedings to be conducted expeditiously requires the des-
ignated judge to proceed in this fashion.83
Finally, the argument on detention was rejected by the Judge. A person named in a
certiﬁcate does not have the right to apply for release from custody, in the same
manner as a person accused of serious offences under the Canadian criminal law.
The Federal Court concluded that the scope of the principles of fundamental justice,
found in section 7 of the Charter, applicable in proceedings under the security certiﬁcate
process must be analysed in the context of immigration principles and policies and
not according to criminal law standards:
[A] review of the provisions of section 40.1 of the Immigration Act and its leg-
islative purpose as expressed in section 38.1 conﬁrms that the proceedings are to
be conducted expeditiously, with the concomitant expectation that the detention
of the person will not be lengthy. [. . .] Having considered the detention require-
ment in section 40.1 of the Immigration Act in the immigration context, I am
satisﬁed that the principles of fundamental justice do not require Parliament to
create a procedure providing for the pre-determination release of the person, as
was submitted by counsel for the plaintiff.84
In brief, the Federal Court conﬁrmed the constitutionality of security certiﬁcates
(former section 40.1, now section 77 of IRPA). To this date, this is the only caselaw
where the Courts analyzed and concluded on the constitutionality of the security
certiﬁcate. With IRPA, it will be interesting to see which trend the Courts will take.
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CONCLUSION
One difﬁcult aspect addressed in this paper is the strong preoccupation of States
towards security that inﬂuences the status of foreign nationals, despite the recogni-
tion of fundamental rights for all in Canada. The solution deﬁnitely rests in a bal-
ancing act of the State’s security concerns with their obligation to respect the fundamental
rights of migrants. The principle of territorial sovereignty cannot justify unlimited
violations of rights and freedoms that are based on nationality. In other words, ter-
ritorial sovereignty has to be conceived in a way that is compatible with existing
mechanisms and structures of the international and national human rights system.
Therefore, it is essential to recognize and to clarify the rights of non-citizens in the
state’s sovereignty context. Unfortunately, too often, for most politicians as for pub-
lic opinion in these troubled times, “laws that arouse deep concern about civil lib-
erties when applied to citizens are standard fare in the immigration context”.85 This
leading thought needs to be changed in order to maintain equal treatment between
citizens and non-citizens.
There are only exceptional circumstances where fundamental rights may be sus-
pended for a limited period of time. Derogations are allowed in some international
treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European
Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights addi-
tionally include derogation clauses allowing many of the rights protected to be dero-
gated from in exceptional circumstances.86 In the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, derogation requires
an ofﬁcially proclaimed “public emergency” that “threatens the life of the nation”.
Although none of the human rights instruments or treaty monitoring bodies has
developed a catalogue of the situations that qualify as a “public emergency”, this
was intended by the drafters to be an extremely difﬁcult burden to meet.
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires
indeed that any derogation be applied (1) only “to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation”, (2) consistent with the State’s other obligations under
international law, and (3) without discrimination on protected grounds. The Human
Rights Committee’s approach to State reports has also indicated that it believes that
derogation under article 4 must be temporary, subject to some sort of parliamentary
and judicial control, and responsive to an apparent, violent situation that cannot oth-
erwise be controlled, above and beyond mere social unrest.87 In conclusion, even in
situations threatening the life of the nation, a State must still demonstrate that any
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derogation of a particular right is justiﬁed in scope and duration by the speciﬁc 
circumstances it is facing.
The non-discrimination provisions are not subject to speciﬁc clawbacks for rea-
sons of security, and derogation clauses prohibit a suspension of rights in a discrimi-
natory manner. However, according to the general doctrine of non-discrimination
which has emerged in the case law of the human rights treaty bodies, differentiation
is permitted if it is based on “reasonable and objective criteria” and if the discrim-
inatory means are “proportional to the reasonable end”. In other words, differential
treatment is permissible where the distinction is made pursuant to a legitimate aim,
has an objective justiﬁcation, and reasonable proportionality exists between the
means employed and the aims sought to be realized. Otherwise, the differentiation
constitutes discrimination and is illegal.88 It should be noted, however, that the
equality principle mandates that migrants never be deprived of basic protections of
physical security and fair trial: selective denial of those protections would indeed
never be reasonable or proportionate.89
These security concerns are only one example of a larger issue, that of a princi-
pled approach to any differential treatment between nationals and foreigners. The
standard against discrimination has not yet been consistently applied to impose demand-
ing requirements in evaluating States’ grounds for admission and expulsion. This
might change in the future.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s General Recom-
mendation 30 (August 2004), on “Discrimination against non-citizens”, clariﬁes gen-
eral principles for responsibilities of States parties to the Convention vis-à-vis
non-citizens and deals in particular with issues of protection against hate speech and
racial violence, administration of justice, expulsion and deportation of non-citizens,
economic, social and cultural rights. It recommends that States parties “ensure that
any measures taken in the ﬁght against terrorism do not discriminate, in purpose or
effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that
non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic proﬁling or stereotyping”. It also
stipulates: “Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or
immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentia-
tion, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not
applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of
this aim”.90 It is possible, thus, to provide some restrictions on State’s actions in the
immigration realm by imposing on States the following general guidance:
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1. There is no possible differentiation between citizens and non-citizens regarding
basic protections for physical security and fair trial.
2. A differentiation between citizens and non-citizens is legal if a State can make
out a “reasonable and objective case” that differing treatment of applicants of a
particular national origin is required for its security.91
This, of course, implies some supervision by the national courts and the interna-
tional committees. In Canada, most of the new security measures introduced since
2001 have not yet been put to the test of a constitutional challenge. No doubt they
all will. We can only hope that the Courts will take these criteria as a premise to
their analysis and require that Canadian authorities systematically justify the differ-
entiation between nationals and foreigners as regards recourses and remedies against
decisions susceptible to deeply affect their rights and freedoms.
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